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  The Nature of Belief and the Method of Its Justification in Husserl’s 
Philosophy 
  





The present paper attempts to accomplish the following: (1) to clarify and critically discuss the 
phenomenology of “belief” as we find it in Husserl’s Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (1913) (henceforward, Ideas I); (2) to clarify 
and critically discuss the manner in which the phenomenological method treats beliefs; (3) to 
clarify and critically discuss the manner of belief justification as described by the 
phenomenological method; and (4) to argue that, just as the phenomenological method can be 
used to validate scientific hypotheses, it can likewise be practised in our everyday worldly 
comportment to justify our everyday, commonsense beliefs. The paper proceeds from the idea that 
the phenomenological method is not the static descriptive method some make it out to be, but, 
rather, a living method at the service of life. The author begins with some preliminary remarks 
about Husserl’s concerns with unfounded or presupposed beliefs and their necessary 
“suspension” as dictated by the phenomenological reduction and epoche (“the method”). He then 
engages the text of Ideas I, especially sections 101 to 106, where Husserl presents a 
phenomenological conception of the character of belief. The paper concludes by treating the 
nature of belief justification, or “rational positing”, and puts forward the view that the 
phenomenological method in everyday practice can aid us in the realization of responsible 
epistemic conduct and, ultimately, lead toward responsible conduct towards ourselves and, hence, 






Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological method 
promises new foundations for science, logic and 
mathematics. This was, after all, Husserl’s intention.1 
It is thus easy for readers of Husserl to ignore the 
obvious, namely that, in virtue of establishing the a 
priori foundations of science, the phenomenological 
method in everyday practice can, in much the same 
                                                          
1 In the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, Husserl states that 
phenomenology “designates two things: a new kind of 
descriptive method … and an a priori science derived from 
it” (1927/1971, p. 77). 
way that it can validate scientific hypotheses, also 
prove useful in the justification of our everyday 
beliefs. What is thus proposed in this paper is that the 
phenomenological method can also be understood as 
a method of epistemic justification. In other words, 
that this method, which uncovers the manner in which 
intentional acts gain their justification or “fulfilment” 
through a synthetic act of intuition, likewise serves as 
the condition for the possibility of everyday 
knowledge. 
 
This claim rests on the view that the paradigm of an 
intentional act is belief. In fact, some Husserl scholars 
have suggested that all intentional acts are of the 
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character of beliefs. Johanna Maria Tito (1990), for 
instance, states that “intentionality, the ego’s being 
related to its object, is an act of believing” (p. 67). 
The view can be characterized as follows: an 
intentional relation (where consciousness is 
consciousness of X) is an intentional relation of 
believing when the intention assumes a previous 
familiarity with an intentional object (with X as a 
possible object of cognition), or vice versa; in this 
way, consciousness always “believes in” the object 
toward which it is directed. Thus, an intentional act is 
“characterized” as a believing in an (intentional) 
object which, if intuitively given, confirms the act, 
and, if not intuitively given (as it is intended), has the 
effect of nullifying the act.  
 
The focus of my attention is on the discussion of 
these topics as presented in the second half of 
Husserl’s (1913) Ideas Pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, First Book (henceforward, Ideas I). In 
that work, the nature of belief and a careful 
articulation of the nature of justification, or 
confirmation - what Husserl calls “rational positing” - 
is carefully presented. The next section begins with 
some preliminary remarks about Husserl’s concerns 
with unfounded or unjustified beliefs and their 
necessary “suspension” as dictated by the 
phenomenological epoche. I then engage the text of 
Ideas I, especially sections 101 to 106, where Husserl 
presents a phenomenological conception of the 
character of belief. I conclude by treating the nature 
of belief justification, or “rational positing”, where I 
also put forward the view that the phenomenological 
method in everyday practice can aid us in the 
realization of responsible epistemic conduct and 
authentic being.  
  
The “Unreasonable” Status of Beliefs According to 
Phenomenology2  
 
Suspension of one’s beliefs is perhaps the most 
significant demand of the phenomenological method. 
The revelatory “modes” of givenness of phenomena 
themselves are not revealed if one does not “bracket” 
or “suspend” the validity of world-beliefs in a 
specifically methodological way. The clarity of 
thought which the method promises can only come 
about after all knowledge claims are, Husserl says, 
“tested and contested” (1913/1998, p. 62). It is the 
phenomenological method, as a method of testing and 
contesting, then, that requires us to set in abeyance 
                                                          
2 The word “unreason” [Unvernunft] is opposed to “reason” 
(or, as will be shown, to “rational justification”, 
“fulfilment”, “confirmation”, and so on). Husserl considers 
“‘unreason’ as the negative counterpart of reason” (1913/ 
1998, p. 344). 
both our everyday beliefs and those beliefs we hold in 
higher regard, such as scientific beliefs. In practice, 
this turns out to be a rigorous requirement, since our 
embeddedness in our mundane existence resists this 
type of universal belief suspension. Nevertheless, 
authentic thinking demands this effort. 
 
The answer as to why this methodological 
requirement is necessary should seem obvious: 
following Descartes, we rid ourselves of unfounded 
presuppositions so as to re-establish the whole of 
human, scientific and philosophical knowledge upon 
apodictically certain premises untainted by dogmatic 
prejudices. According to some notable interpreters of 
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, however, the 
idea that the reduction’s task is to methodologically 
reconstruct the epistemological edifice is far from 
being the case. It is Eugen Fink who writes, 
  
The sense of the epoche, on the one hand, 
and of the action of reduction, on the other, 
is liable to a misinterpretation which has its 
basis likewise in the mistaken view that the 
epoche has a “simple straightforward aim”, 
namely, that it is nothing but a “method of 
confirmation”, an exaggerated Methodism.  
(Fink, 1932/1995, p. 45) 
 
The admonition here is that the aim of the epoche, of 
the bracketing or suspension which goes hand in hand 
with the phenomenological reduction, is not simply to 
confirm those beliefs which are held in abeyance; it is 
not, Fink says, an “exaggerated Methodism”. Instead, 
the point, Fink goes on to say, is to demonstrate 
subjectivity as “taking precedence constitutively over 
the being of the world”, as showing the priority of 
subjectivity in constituting the sense of the world for 
us (1932/1995, p. 48). This means that the epoche 
merely strips us of those beliefs in order to unveil a 
foundational subjectivity from which the constitution 
(origin and structure) of beliefs in general emerges, or 
upon which it depends. 
 
The epoche, however, does more than open up the 
region of a foundational subjectivity, or what turns 
out to be the same, the region of pure consciousness. 
The phenomenological practitioner gains access to 
other regions, most significantly the region of objects. 
“Indeed,” writes David Carr (1999), what is opened 
up is “the whole world of objects for a consciousness, 
treated strictly as they are intended by consciousness” 
(p. 79). Thus, while it is true that exposing the priority 
of the ego, of consciousness, or of transcendental 
subjectivity in the process of world constitution has 
been a goal of the phenomenological reduction since 
its explicit formulation in The Idea of Phenomenology 
(1907), it is false to say that this is its only goal. A 
phenomenologist is interested in more than form, or 
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the formal conditions of constitution: she is also 
interested in content, that is, the objects constituted or 
given to consciousness. The epoche, contra Fink, is a 
methodism. After all, “we take this step,” writes 
Husserl in The Idea of Phenomenology, “in agreement 
with the tenet of Descartes concerning ‘clear and 
distinct perceptions’” (1907/1964, p. 6) - and we are 
all agreed that Descartes’s scepticism was, in fact, a 
“Methodism”. The question motivating this “step” is 
the Grundfrage, the grounding question of the 
phenomenological method, namely, “How can the 
absolute self-givenness of cognition reach something 
not self-given and how is this reaching to be 
understood?” (Husserl, 1907/1964, p. 5). Thus it is 
also the “reaching out” to the transcendent object, 
how acts of consciousness directed toward real-world 
objects gain fulfilment, how knowledge is possible, 
and what this possibility requires, that are at issue and 
dependent on the phenomenological method for their 
clarification, and not merely, as Fink (1932/1995) 
argues, the role of subjectivity in the constitution of 
the formal conditions of sense. 3    
 
What Husserl is conscious of, and what he aims to 
avoid, is the corruption of phenomenological 
knowledge by everyday, mundane, beliefs that 
presuppose their justification. This is the case with the 
“thesis” of the natural attitude, which, as Paul Ricoeur 
(1967) asserts, “contaminates belief” (p. 18). Our 
unjustified belief in the existence of a world 
independent of our experience, that is, contaminates 
our entire belief structure, leading us astray not only 
in our everyday lives (as when we claim to know, for 
instance, what death “is like”), but also in our 
scientific endeavours (as when we claim to know that 
sub-atomic particles are “real entities”). In either case, 
the evidence for either kind of claim is, in most cases, 
lacking and merely presumed. Thus, as “cognition 
only reaches as far as self-givenness reaches”, as 
Husserl says in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907/ 
1964, p. 8), those beliefs which posit beyond the 
sphere of what is given (whose object reaches past the 
sphere of givenness) are surely unjustified - and, 
worse, unjustifiable. 
 
The directive to limit ourselves to describing the 
objects of experience as experienced, and only within 
those limits, highlights an aspect of our existence 
about which we can speak without embarrassment or 
intellectual trepidation (regardless of whether or not 
we are phenomenologists). Knowledge of the world is 
                                                          
3 Written after Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations (1929), the 
Sixth Cartesian Meditation (1932) is definitely influenced 
by Fink’s reading of Heidegger, as is evident in his attempt 
to ignore those aspects of Husserl’s early work that exhibit 
a more Cartesian flavour. Fink, in effect, attempts to portray 
Husserl as a critic of Heidegger, albeit anachronistically.   
limited to the manner, or mode, of its givenness and 
to the “as” structure of experience - that is, its 
conceptual make up. Staying within these limitations, 
we can better grasp the possibility of knowledge, and, 
more particularly, the manner of confirmation, or 
justification, of our most important everyday beliefs. 
Again, this is not to confuse phenomenology with an 
exaggerated methodism (although it is a method, but 
not an overly excessive one). After all, those beliefs 
originally placed in suspension are not rejected; 
rather, we consider them as placed upon the analytical 
gurney where they can be scrutinized so as to reveal 
their origin, the modes of givenness of their objects, 




Before going further, however, we have to enquire as 
to the nature of beliefs. While commonly held to be 
mental states or representations (not to be confused 
with affective states, such as worry or excitement, but 
states which are more explicitly intentional) that 
purport to “accurately” match some situation or state 
of affairs in the world, from the phenomenological 
standpoint beliefs can be viewed a bit differently. 
Husserl says that a belief is a mental acceptance of 
the “actuality” (wirklichkeit) or “certainty” of an 
intentional object - it is a position-taking attitude 
where one understands oneself to be accepting 
something to be the case, accepting it as certain, 
doubtful, erroneous, and so on.4 For instance, my 
perceptual belief in the state of affairs characterized 
as “cars hurrying past my window” - a belief 
supported by my auditory senses  -  is also a positing 
of the actuality of the state of affairs as presented by 
perception. As purporting to match, or be about, the 
reality or actuality of a state of affairs itself, however, 
a belief can either succeed in doing so or it can fail; 
that is, it can be either a true belief or a false belief. 
True beliefs are said to be constitutive of knowledge. 
The problem is, as Plato shows in the Theaetatus 
(201b-c), that I can have true beliefs but not 
knowledge.  
  
Ultimately, the view advocated here is that a concern 
with the nature, status and eventual reinstatement of 
everyday, mundane beliefs is central to Husserl’s 
phenomenological project. After all, we cannot help 
                                                          
4 Here we can speak of “occurrent” and “dispositional” 
beliefs. In the case of occurrent beliefs, a belief is an 
“actual” [acktuell] position-taking attitude, and one 
understands oneself to be in such a state at that particular 
moment in time. In the case of dispositional beliefs, a belief 
stands as a “potential” [inacktuell] position-taking attitude, 
or mental state where one might understand oneself to be in 
such a state in the future - or in which one has understood 
oneself to be in the past (cf. Husserl, 1998, §113). 
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but live in our beliefs. Moreover, at the moment of 
self-reflection, we cannot help but care about our 
belief’s validity. Thus, it is crucial for Husserl that 
one question one’s most deeply held beliefs so as to 
ultimately reinstate them with the full force of 
phenomenological clarity. These efforts are motivated 
by the idea that beliefs are requisite for conscious 
experience itself. Another way to say this is that 
beliefs ultimately determine the directionality of 
consciousness and the purpose of conscious life. This 
means, then, that “truth” itself depends on beliefs. 
This, however, must be properly understood. That 
truth depends on belief might seem to suggest that 
Husserl is a full-fledged idealist in the sense that an 
intentional act, or belief, is the “source” of truth and, 
what’s more, evidence - that consciousness is the 
“source” of evidence, of what fulfils our intentional 
demands. To think that consciousness is the “source” 
of fulfilment is to misunderstand Husserl’s entire 
doctrine of intuitive fulfilment, and so, as far as I am 
concerned, his particular brand of phenomenology. 
What must be stressed, however, is that, by seeking 
truth and evidence for their fulfilment, beliefs are the 
“source” of the epistemic value truth and evidence 
enjoy. In other words, without beliefs, truth and 
evidence would not be truth and evidence, since they 
are only of value to an experiencing, interested 
subject. Only to this extent is consciousness the 
“source of evidence”. 
 
As I see it, the underlying motive of the 
phenomenological method arises as a reaction to both 
the naïve way in which we are disposed to believe 
without proper evidence and the manner in which we 
overlook the value of beliefs in our conscious life. In 
our everyday, natural attitude, things in the world 
stand around us and we believe them to be actual and 
real without questioning this actuality or this reality. 
Husserl recognizes that, in our mundane existence, 
“real objects are there, definite … agreeing with what 
is actually perceived” (1913/1998, p. 52). In my 
normal involvement with things around me, I take my 
perception as “accurately” representing those things 
in a definite manner. I do not think my perceptions 
are problematic. Perceptions “correspond” to real 
existent objects in the external world, and I firmly 
believe that visual experience, for instance, gives me 
a complete representation of the objects that I see.5 
Consequently, I do not think, nor do I have a reason 
to think, that I am lacking an aspect of the object, or 
that I am “adding” to my experience of the presented 
object pieces absent from what is in fact presented. 
Due to the trusting nature of my everyday attitude, I 
thus fall easily into error and am easily deceived. In 
                                                          
5 A valuable commentary on Husserl’s theory of perception 
is given by Kevin Mulligan in The Cambridge Companion 
to Husserl (Smith & Smith, 1995).   
the natural attitude, that is, I simply accept that all of 
my beliefs regarding objects and states of affairs are 
true. 
 
That the world and the entities in it turn out to be the 
way I uncritically assume they are is not enough for 
genuine knowledge, since it is false that true beliefs 
on their own constitute knowledge properly 
speaking.6 As far as my everyday comportment goes, 
to be uncritical of my beliefs is to be constantly on the 
verge of self-deception. The scientific disciplines 
have long known this.  Natural science engages in the 
perpetual quest to affirm or deny that which we think 
about the world - to “justify” our thoughts about it, 
our hypotheses. Nevertheless, the inquiries of the 
natural sciences do not go far enough, since, while 
they question the beliefs about worldly entities, they 
fail to question the belief in “the world” itself, 
assuming the independent existence of the world as 
true, whether justified or not. As Husserl puts it: 
  
“The” world is a fact-world always there; 
at the most it is at odd points “other” than I 
supposed, this or that under such names as 
“illusion”, “hallucination”, and the like, 
must be “struck out of it”, so to speak; but 
the “it” remains ever [a] world that has its 
being out there. (1913/1998, p. 57) 
 
The thesis that the “world has its being out there” as 
an entity essentially independent of my conscious life 
allows the sceptic to argue that our beliefs are 
supported by neither sense experience nor reason, but 
merely by our habitual reliance on the “constancy and 
coherence of certain impressions”.7 For Husserl, then, 
in order to distinguish between mere blind belief or 
opinion and genuine knowledge, the “general thesis 
of the world”, the naïve belief in its independent 
existence arising from the constancy and coherence of 
“certain impressions”, must be suspended (1913/ 
1998, §31) and, more importantly, tested and 
contested (1913/1998, §32). 
   
If the “general thesis of the world” turns out to be true 
after we submit it to phenomenological scrutiny, it 
will not only be a true belief, but it would also be 
justified; it will thus count as knowledge (in Husserl’s 
sense). Moreover, after the reduction, if we accept the 
thesis, or the belief, regarding the independent 
existence of the world, this will not be due to the fact 
that it is true, but to the fact that we now have 
reasons, arrived at in the most rigorous way  - that is, 
by means of the phenomenological method - for 
                                                          
6 That is, in the tradition of Plato and Descartes and pre-
Gettier epistemology.  
7 The notable sceptic here is, of course, David Hume in A 
Treatise of Human Nature (1739/2000, 1.4.2). 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007  Page 5 of 10 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
  
accepting it as a viable thesis. However, because what 
is given in conscious experience - the field of 
phenomenological research - is only phenomena, I 
cannot be justified in believing in a world whose 
“being” is “out there”, since I cannot get past the 
phenomenon of the world to what lies behind it, to 
what “causes” it.8 In such a case, I must form a 
different belief which more adequately coincides with 
the state of affairs revealed as a result of the 
phenomenological approach to it. This is the case, or 
should be the case, not only in our scientific search 
for truth, but also in our everyday comportment.   
 
Everyday Beliefs Exposed 
 
In the fourth chapter of the third part of Ideas I, 
Husserl discusses the noetic and noematic structures 
of experience. It is within this discussion that Husserl 
treats the phenomenon of belief, explicating its 
manifold characteristics and its different modalities. 
What was initially left at the doorstep of 
phenomenology is thus ushered in, or reintroduced, 
and itself subjected to the phenomenological method. 
 
What are beliefs, then, phenomenologically? We 
reject first the psychological conception of belief in 
terms of a feeling of conviction, such as “I believe in 
P because I feel that P is true”. Phenomenologically, 
beliefs are acts of consciousness which can either find 
fulfilment in a correlative experience or remain 
empty. They are, furthermore, intimately related to 
intuitive evidence, and so can be neither verified nor 
nullified by feelings. For this reason, Husserl finds it 
necessary to relate modes of being [Seinsmodi], 
which are given, to belief characteristics [Glaubens-
charaktere] (1913/1998, §103). This correlation is 
one between that which appears and an intentional act 
or a belief, which, moreover, is made certain by the 
appearance itself. By considering these primal 
believings in being certain, all that is claimed is that 
they are about something “actual” [wirklich], namely 
the perceived object as perceived. Husserl writes: 
 
As noetic characters, correlatively related 
to modes of Being - as “doxic” or “belief 
characters” - we may cite as closely linked 
with intuitable presentations the perceptual 
belief present as a real (reell) factor in 
normal perception, and functioning therein 
as a “sense of reality”, and, more closely 
still, perceptual assurance or its equivalent; 
to it corresponds in the appearing “object” 
as noematic correlate the ontical character 
“real” (wirklich) … . Such are “thetic” 
acts, acts that “posit” Being. (pp. 249-250) 
                                                          
8 Unlike Kant, Husserl suggests that one can neither know 
nor think what lies behind phenomena.   
 
Beliefs are thus thetic acts, or acts that posit being.9 
Furthermore, as Husserl suggests in the quoted 
passage, the belief itself functions as an intentional 
noema; that is, it functions as, in general cases, the 
“sense of reality”, and, in particular cases, the “sense 
of a particular thing”. Thus, we can say that beliefs 
are acts correlated to, and believings in, being - in the 
certainty of that which is given. The positing of, for 
example, “something real” as an object emerges in the 
horizon of our experience, ultimately determines our 
attentional ray to something that is (as opposed to 
something that is not). The belief, in other words, 
posits the substructural scaffolding of what might be 
made intelligible given the manifold nature of 
presentations.10   
 
Beliefs as noetic acts are thus characterized as certain 
if their noematic objects have the characteristic of 
being actual, or of “being real”. Beliefs, however, can 
easily take on the character of doubt if their objects 
appear questionable or “doubtful”, as is the case 
when I doubt whether what appears is a mere illusion, 
or a “mere seeming”. The profiles of an appearing 
object “suggest” a man, but further profiles suggest a 
tree which in the night “seems” like a man moving. 
Consciousness thus takes on the character of doubt: I 
am no longer sure of what I see, or whether what I see 
is actual. But, as more and more profiles are given, 
one possibility gains “weight”, Husserl says, and the 
belief acquires again the character of certainty (1913/ 
1998, p. 250). 
  
Belief modalities, therefore, pass from certain, to 
probable, to doubtful, depending on the “weight”, or 
the evidence, of the given in perceptual intuition. As 
suggested above, however, the root of all possible 
modalities lies in an original belief that was at a time 
certain. Husserl calls this belief the “primary belief” 
[Urglaube] or “protodoxa” [Urdoxa]. In other words, 
the modality of probable belief, as in “that might not 
be a man after all”, presupposes a more fundamental 
belief, such as “that is a man”, which came before it 
when I first encountered the profiles suggestive of a 
“human-like figure”, and immediately before that as 
“a thing”. 
 
Related to this is the “radically false doctrine” [Die 
                                                          
9 Notice that the Latin posito or positus renders the Greek 
thesis which means “holding”. 
10In terms of the language of noesis-noema, if we take the 
object of the belief as a noema, then this noema is a sort of 
blueprint which allows perception to be perception of 
something. If the belief posits a “red car”, the noema “red 
car” allows the noetic act to recognize the red car when it 
appears. This is the view of Dagfin Føllesdal, who refers to 
the noema as a “pattern” (1969, p. 687), and Michael 
Dummett, who calls it an “instruction” (1993, p. 113).   
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 7, Edition 2 September 2007  Page 6 of 10 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of Rhodes University in South Africa and Edith Cowan University in Australia. This document is subject to 
copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium (print, electronic or otherwise) without the express permission of the 
publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
  
grundfalsche Lehre] concerning beliefs. This doctrine 
holds that “a genus ‘Belief’ simply splits up into 
certainty, supposal, and so forth, as though the 
relation could be expressed by spinning out a series of 
co-ordinate species” (1913/1998, p. 252). The reason 
this doctrine is false is because it assumes that the 
proto-belief, the original belief, could be otherwise 
than certain; to put it differently, what is assumed is 
that, upon perceiving an object, one believes that the 
object is not actual. In fact, whenever we perceive an 
object, we perceive it as actual, and our belief is 
always certain, or else we cannot claim to perceive 
the object at all. What is important is to keep in mind 
the phenomenological principle which states that 
what we are always conscious of are appearances. 
Thus, for instance, I walk toward a shadowy structure 
in the darkness. The belief in the shadowy structure is 
a belief in the presence of a shadowy structure - it is a 
belief possessing the character of certainty. As I move 
closer, I begin to think, or believe, that the shadowy 
structure is, in fact, the heavy shadow of a large 
Eucalyptus tree. The original belief is a certain belief 
in the actuality of whatever appears. Time and 
perspective, however, allow me to acquaint myself 
with what appears, perhaps leading me to specify the 
object of my belief more clearly, and I may then 
believe that what I see is a tree and not a shadow. 
Closer inspection, moreover, forces me to modify my 
belief once again: it is not a tree, but something else 
… I am not sure what it is. Thus, the foundational 
proto-belief is always certain, since its object is given 
as actual. This can change, however, with time, 
perspective and accumulation of evidence, from 
certain to probable as the belief’s “weight” changes, 
ultimately changing a consciousness itself into 
uncertainty. 
 
Beliefs, in both their scientific and everyday 
manifestation, are thus fundamental in the sense that 
they make up the whole of our intelligible world. 
Originally, all my beliefs are certain; it is only 
experience, evidence, that can overturn this certainty. 
Thus, beliefs motivate us to live, since only through 
life can this original certainty be upheld or nullified. 
In this way, “protodoxa” are the conditions for the 
possibility of subjective preferences, intentional 
directedness, rejection and acceptance, affirmation 
and negation, and so on. “Every negation,” writes 
Husserl, “is a negation of something, and this 
Something points us back to this or that modality of 
belief” (1913/1998, §106). The attitude of the ego 
toward things is thus informed by what we can call 
background or, more appropriately, enabling beliefs.11 
These enabling beliefs allow the ego, or 
consciousness, to direct itself; these are the conditions 
                                                          
11 For more on “enabling” beliefs see John Searle (1992, 
175-196).  
for the possibility of intentionality! In its intentional 
life, consciousness expresses preferences and 
inclinations which cannot be explained otherwise than 
by appeal to these enabling beliefs. Believing in this 
or that object is in this way similar to the nature of 
“preferring” [vorziehen], or of a leaning-toward 
accepting the reason for believing in what is believed. 
However, proto-doxa, or these primal beliefs, Husserl 
suggests, are more primordial than “interests”, 
“leanings” or “preferring” (1913/1998, p. 254).  
 
Justification and the Phenomenology of Reason  
 
Once the phenomenological status of beliefs is 
explicated, the next step in the inquiry requires 
Husserl to show how these beliefs constitute 
knowledge. The way in which the phenomenological 
method can clarify the possibility of legitimate 
knowledge is thus the topic of the fourth part of Ideas 
I. Entitled “The Phenomenology of Reason”, it 
attempts to clarify the nature of “rational legitimacy”, 
or Ausweisen.12 “Whatever we assert,” writes Husserl 
in the prologue to chapter 2 of part four, “concerning 
objects - provided we speak reasonably - we must 
submit, whether as meant or spoken, to ‘logical 
grounding’, ‘proof’, direct ‘vision’, or mediated 
‘insight’” (1913/1998, p. 326). Klaus Held interprets 
this as saying that “Intentional, living consciousness 
keeps moving forward in its search for the fulfilment 
and verification of its intentions which are, more or 
less, ‘vague’ or ‘empty’” (quoted in Welton, 2003, p. 
18). For Husserl, this project is the continuation of 
thoughts expressed in the Logical Investigations, 
where he writes, “we prefer to speak of ‘knowledge’ 
where an opinion, in the normal sense of a belief, has 
been confirmed or attested” (1913/1970, §16). 
 
Consequently, integral to Husserl’s “phenomenology 
of reason”, is the distinction between mere opinions 
and justified beliefs. Husserl puts the matter as 
follows: “We have in the first place the distinction 
between positional experiences in which what is set 
down acquires primordial givenness, and those in 
which it does not acquire such givenness; between 
‘perceiving’, ‘seeing’ acts, that is, … and non-
’perceiving’ acts” (1013/1998, p. 326). In the “first 
place”, where the belief gains intuitive fulfilment, we 
have a presumptive rationality; in the “second place”, 
what we have is an a-rational [Unverkunft] belief, 
                                                          
12“Ausweisen” is used by Husserl to mean “to legitimate”, 
“to show”, “to demonstrate”, “to prove”; “ausweisbar”, as 
in “vernünftig ausweisbar”, is translated as “that which is 
rationally demonstrable”, or “being something which can be 
shown rationally” (F. Kersten’s translation), but it is also 
used by Husserl to mean “that which can be rationally 
legitimated”. See Dorion Cairns (1973), A Guide for 
Translating Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff).  
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since it does not receive intuitive support. For a belief 
to be rationally grounded, therefore, is for it to be 
justified methodologically and not merely presumed 
nor a-rational.  
 
The place of “reason” in the phenomenology of 
reason and in Husserl’s theory of justification should 
not be misconstrued, however. By “reason”, Husserl 
means the following: perceived objects “motivate” 
beliefs in the sense that, when an object appears, a 
proto-belief in the object as certain is formed; when 
the object-appearance takes place, consciousness has 
no recourse but to consider the belief in the object as 
certain, and this is the case, Husserl suggests, of 
having a reason to live in that belief, or for a belief to 
be “rationally motivated”. Reason, in this context, 
thus means having rational support for a belief, or 
reasons to believe, in a thing when the thing is given 
in evidence, or in its own “bodily presence”. By being 
intuitively fulfilled, therefore, the belief takes on the 
character of a rational belief. This suggests the 
obvious, namely that not every belief is rational. 
“Although not every position is rational,” writes 
Marcus Brainard, “wherever there is evidence, the 
position is indeed rational” (2002, p. 205). To have 
evidence, in this respect, is to have reasons to stake a 
claim to know the thing - to be rationally motivated. 
In perceptual experience, the reasons that allow one to 
be justified are, of course, subject to falsification 
through future experience. Husserl summarizes the 
matter in the following way: 
  
In principle a thing in the real world, a Being 
in this sense, can, within the finite limits of 
appearance, appear only “inadequately”. 
Essentially connected therewith is the fact that 
no rational positing which rests on an 
appearance that presents itself so inadequately 
can be “definitive”, “invincible”; that no such 
positing in its particularity is equivalent to the 
downright assertion that “the Thing is real”, 
but only to the assertion “It is real” on the 
supposition that the advance of experience 
does not bring in its train “stronger rational 
motives” which exhibit the original positing as 
one that must be “cancelled” in the further 
context [Zusammenhang]. Moreover, the 
positing is rationally motivated only through 
the appearance (the imperfectly fulfilled 
perceptual sense [Wahrnehmungssinn]) in and 
for itself, considered in its particular detail. 
(1913/1998, p. 331) 
 
It is the inadequate givenness of “things in the real 
world”, however, that justify. I claim to know a thing, 
that is, on the presumption that further experience will 
continue to verify what I know about it. This means 
that I do not now know, nor can I claim to know, the 
thing conclusively, or with absolute certainty, without 
a very pronounced dogmatic arrogance. Empirical 
knowledge is always subject to the limitations of 
experience, and its propositions and knowledge 
claims are always liable to “cancellation” in light of 
“stronger rational motives”, namely further perceptual 
evidence and further experience. What this means is 
that, while justification is a matter of degrees, the 
rational motivation behind my claim to knowledge is, 
in fact, the imperfectly appearing phenomenon itself. 
This further suggests that, according to Husserl, no 
philosophical theory can give us criteria that will lead 
us to infallible certainty, not even phenomenology! 
 
In §140 of Ideas I, Husserl writes:  
 
An evidental act [an intuitive act] and a non-
evidental act [a merely empty intention, such 
as a belief] can coincide, as a consequence of 
which … the former [the intuitive act] acquires 
the characteristic of a validating act, whereas 
the latter [the belief] acquires the characteristic 
of an act which is “being” validated. The 
positing with insight [einsichtig] of the one 
functions as “confirmatory” for the positing 
without insight of the other. The “positum” 
[the belief as meaning intending] is “verified” 
or even “confirmed” … . How the process 
looks, and can look, is pre-delineated by the 
essence of the kinds of positings in question … 
. For every genus of posita the forms of 
essentially possible verification must be made 
clear phenomenologically. (1913/1998, §140) 
 
Again, to know is a matter of “coincidence” between 
an evidental intuition and a non-evidental intentional 
act. The “positing” which coincides with an intuitive 
insight is a rational positing, which functions as a 
confirmed intentional act, or belief. (The fundamental 
requirements for verification, or justification, 
however, are different for different types of acts and 
different objects. Beliefs in essential objects [e.g. 
number sets, circularity, redness, etc.] are, then, 
justified on the basis of different sorts of evidence 
than what is given in perceptual beliefs.)  
 
What the phenomenological method allows us to see 
is that the possibility of complete and fully adequate 
justification for our higher level or scientific beliefs 
requires eidetic or essential presentations, while 
empirical or perceptual beliefs - the bulk of our 
everyday beliefs - can only approximate this level of 
justification, and even so only through continual 
experience of the same state of affairs or object of 
belief. Husserl refers to these different types of 
evidence as “assertoric” and “apodictic”, the former 
corresponding to empirical experience, the latter to 
eidetic, or essential, insight (1913/1998, §131). 
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Nevertheless, the fact is that both modes of givenness 
are sources of epistemic justification for our beliefs. I 
can be justified in holding my belief that a certain 
state of affairs obtains within a certain temporally 
determined experience; however, that my belief will 
continue to be supported by further perceptual 
experience is beyond the scope of any rational motive 
I might now have. I am thus justified now, but it 
would be irresponsible of me to project this sense of 
justification to what I can be justified in believing in 
the future. This is because present experience is the 
reason to believe. Husserl says, “Actual experience, 
and not merely a running through in presentation of 
possible perceptions, provides an actual validation of 
positings bearing upon something real, let us say, 
validation of the positings of the factual existence of 
events belonging to Nature” (1913/1998, p. 337). 
  
Another peculiarity regarding belief justification (in 
Husserl’s case) is that one can gain a high degree of 
justification, or evidence, depending on what one’s 
belief is about, or what it posits. For instance, I can be 
more highly justified in holding the belief that “I am 
the only person in this room”, than in holding a belief 
about my first kiss. In the first instance, the object of 
my belief is perceptually verifiable, while, in the 
second instance, its justification depends on whether 
or not I have a good memory. While memory is 
necessary for the recognition of an object presently 
before me, in isolated cases, such as my attempt to 
recall my first kiss, or the order of events 
precipitating a certain car accident, memory is 
notoriously unreliable. Thus, the degree to which the 
former (that I am the only person in the room) is 
justified is higher than the latter (my first kiss). In any 
event, even in the case of memory beliefs, all 
knowledge can be traced back to some original 
intuition or experience which gave one a reason to 
hold a certain belief in the first place. This original 
experience is retained in memory and is recognized in 
the event of its reproduction. “All mediate 
grounding,” writes Husserl, “leads back to immediate 
grounding. With respect to all-object provinces and 
positings related to them, the ‘primal source of 
legitimacy’ [Urquelle alles Rechtes] lies in immediate 
evidence” (1913/1998, p. 338). 
 
All of this does not mean, however, that Husserl is 
committed to an epistemic foundationalism of the 
Cartesian kind. Immediate intuitions on their own are 
not knowledge; there must be a belief coinciding with 
these where the belief itself seeks fulfilment for what 
it posits. In perceptual experience, a belief gains 
fulfilment and can count as knowledge when it 
achieves a perfect coincidence of itself and what it is 
about. This, however, does not happen in “one blow”, 
but rather as a synthesis, a collecting of experiential 
impressions in time one after another. If a conscious 
act of belief, judgment or anticipation were to find its 
fulfilment - or if it were given its object -  
immediately, it would, to quote Dallas Willard, “leave 
us in a state of shock that could hardly count as 
knowing anything” (in Smith & Smith, 1995, p. 146). 
This experience would be shocking since we would 
not know what to make of it; it would be, to use 
William James’s oft quoted phrase, the shock of 
experiencing reality as a “booming, buzzing 
confusion”. 
 
Final Comment  
 
My claim is that the phenomenological method is a 
method of clarification and justification whereby 
beliefs, whether of a scientific character or of the 
everyday existential variety, are seen for the first time 
as they are in themseves together with the manner of 
their fulfilment. We see, that is, what makes a belief a 
justified belief rather than a mere opinion or empty 
claim to knowledge; once this is “seen”, we can either 
reject or accept our beliefs. “I must not accept,” 
Husserl says, “such a proposition until I have put 
parentheses around it” (1913/1998, p. 62). The 
preceding considerations suggest that this “I” that 
does not accept, that this “I” that brackets, is an I 
engaged in a project dictated by beliefs that are 
seldom questioned but that demand to be seen in their 
proper light. It is within the realm of this I’s “perfect 
freedom” (1913/1998, §32), moreover, to accept, 
reject, or, ultimately, be indifferent to performing 
such a task. Responsibility would require that this I 
engage those beliefs and uncover their nature and 
their sources. 
 
As rational creatures, it is our reponsibility to make 
sure that our knowledge claims are well grounded, 
reasonable, or, at the very least, properly justified. 
Experience varies in its veracity, however, and so we 
also want to be clear that the beliefs about those states 
of affairs that we claim to know are arrived at in the 
right way, and that the degree of justification that 
makes of those beliefs pieces of knowledge for us is 
high enough (as Husserl says, “weighty” enough) to 
properly constitute the sort of cognitive confidence 
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